33 ante, 236, 23. See also Radowitz`s Report 217 to Otto von Bismarck, Therapia, October 10, 1887, University of California Films of German Archives, ser. II, Reel 85, Frames 319-321, No. Mr. Bulg. 20. The final lines of this report suggest that Radowitz himself tended to exaggerate Germany`s support for Austria. In a meeting with representatives of the Turkish government, Radowitz stressed that the friendship between Austria and Germany was “unwavering” and that it was “not compromised by the Bulgarian question”. Ibid., frame 321.
3 de Bismarck, Otto zu Reuss, Kissingen, 23 Aug 1887, La Grande Politique, Vol. V, p. 195Google Scholar. 11 Ibid. See also Norman, Rich, Friedrich von Holstein: Politics and Diplomacy in the Era of Bismarck and Wilhelm II (2 volumes, Cambridge, Eng.: University Press, 1965), Vol. I, p. 210-211Google Scholar. On the same pages, Rich cites several examples showing that Holstein did not appreciate the political wisdom of Bismarck`s plans during the first half of 1887. 35 Otto von Bismarck`s marginal note on Radowitz`s Report No.
217 to Otto von Bismarck, Therapia, October 10, 1887, University of California Films of German Archives, ser. II, Reel 85, Frame 321, No. Mr. Bulg. 20. Bismarck wrote this commentary alongside Radowitz`s description of the sultan`s indecisive attitude and his lack of willingness to discuss political issues in depth. 28 Hajo, Holborn, Germany and Turkey (Berlin: Deutsche Verlagsgesellschaft for Politik und Geschichte, 1926), p. 1Google Scholar. See ibid., p. 46-49, for the excellent overview of German-Turkish relations between 1887 and 1889.
Although it was published in 1926, Holborn`s study still has value because the author had access to previously unpublished documents from the Department of Foreign Affairs and unpublished documents from Radowitz. Holborn emphasizes the theme of “disinterest” in Bismarck`s middle East policy. Although Bismarck sought to maintain friendly relations with the sultan and gain an influential position in Constantinople, Bismarck, according to Holborn, never withdrew his initial view that Germany was an “unbiased” observer in the affairs of the Netherlands. By the late 1880s, however, Bismarck was more inclined than before to occasionally use his influence in Constantinople for immediate tactical purposes. See ibid., 69. See also Rich`s concise summary of Bismarck`s Near Eastern Politics in his Friedrich von Holstein, Volume I, p. 175 and 214-216. Rich clearly explains how Bismarck tried to balance Russian power in the Middle East without involving Germany. “In doing so,” Rich writes, “Bismarck has painsskedly freed Germany from its obligations in Eastern Europe, because Germany was not interested in this region and felt the main need to face the threat of France…
It was not a simple policy, but it temporarily kept Russia out of the arms of France and preserved peace in Europe. Ibid., 175. From the point of view of the German Chancellor Otto von Bismarck, the advantage of these agreements, in which Germany did not participate, was the rapprochement of Great Britain with the tripartite alliance of Germany, Italy and Austria-Hungary. 20 For opposing views on the value bismarck put on the Austrian alliance, see Eduard, Heller, The German-Austro-Hungarian Biindnis in Bismarck politics (Berlin: E. S. Mittler – Sohn, 1925), p. 81-85 and 114-117Google Scholar; Karl, Schunmann, The position of Austria-Hungary in the bismarck alliance policy (Berlin: inauguration, University of Berlin, 1926), p. 58-59, 70 and 77Google Scholar; and William, Mommsen, Bismarck: a political picture of life (Munich: F. Bruckmann, 1959), pp.